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Mortgage Securitization & REMICs
Increasingly, the assets of traditional lenders
such as banks and thrifts are being used to back
traded securities - a process known as securi-
tization. (See the Weekly Letter dated July 4,
1986.) Nowhere is this trend more evident than
in the mortgage arena. Up until a decade ago, it
was common practice for mortgage lenders to
keep the mortgages they originated in their own
portfolios. Increasingly, however, mortgages are
being "securitized" - a process that involves
creation of a security backed by mortgage loans.
Holders of these securities receive interest and
principal payments that are supported by the
underlying mortgages and the securities often
can be traded freely in the marketplace. Indi-
vidual savers, pension funds, and other financial
institutions invest in mortgage-backed securities.
With the passage ofthe 1986 Tax Act, the pace
of mortgage securitization is likely to quicken
still further. The new tax law permits creation of
Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits
(REMICs), legal devices that allow mortgage-
backed securities to be better tailored to the
needs of investors and issuers. This Weekly
Letter discusses the major forms of mortgage
securitization, and role of REMICs in this
process.
Background: Mortgage-backed Securities
Securitization of mortgages is motivated by two
forces. First, the banks and thrifts that originate
mortgages can employ securitization to achieve
desired changes in their balance sheet. For
example, if mortgage assets can be "sold out of
portfolio", compliance with regulators' capital/
risk-asset ratio regulation can be facilitated. The
simplest securitization process that achieves this
goal involves creation of a Mortgage Pass-
through Security (MPS). This process involves
selling the mortgages into a trust (called a "gran-
tor" trust) that then issues securities backed by
the underlying mortgages. The payments made
on the underlying mortgage are "passed
through" unaltered to the security holder.
Second, mortgage securitization potentially per-
mits transformation of mortgage debt into
securities that satisfy the diverse tastes of inves-
tors for different patterns of cash-flow, risk and
other investment features. A simple MPS can do
little to transform the underlying mortgage into
more attractive instruments. (Indeed, by its very
nature it takes on precisely the features of the
underlying mortgages, including an uncertain
effective maturity because ofthe possibility of
prepayment of the mortgages.) Two other
devices, the Mortgage-Backed Bond and the
Collateralized Mortgage Obligation, however,
offer the means of transforming mortgage assets
in a more radical way.
The Mortgage-Backed Bond
The Mortgage-Backed Bond (MBB) does not pass
payments through untransformed; rather, the is"
suer of an MBB creates a fixed-term ("call pro-
tected") instrument with fixed coupon
payments. Unlike the case of the MPS, therefore,
the payment flows generated by the underlying
mortgages will not match precisely the timing of
the coupon and principal payment obligations of
the MBB. Thus the market requires that issuers of
MBBs (the holders of the underlying mortgages)
overcollateralize MBB issues so that a "buffer"
of extra mortgage payments and principal is
available to meet unanticipated deviations
between the two payment streams. The dif-
ference between the value ofthe collateral and
the value ofthe MBB liabilities issued repre-
sents, in effect, an equity investment on the part
of the issuer.
Thus, although the mortgage-backed bond
provides investors with a more-nearly "bond
like" instrument than the MPS, it does not
rei ieve the issuer of mortgage assets on his
books; they remain there as collateral for the
MBB liabilities sold by the issuer. In addition,
some argue that the degree of overcollateraliza-
tion required by security-rating agencies for the
MBBs to achieve investment-grade ratings is
more than the market itself would require. This
limits the extent to which a given dollar value of
mortgage assets can be securitized. These con-
siderations likely are responsible for the trivial
size of the MBB market in comparison to other
mortgage-backed securities. (See chart.)FRBSF
Multi-class passthroughs: the CMO
To ideally serve both the portfolio-management
goals of the originator of the mortgage and the
needs of investors, mortgage securitization
would both create an asset "sale" out of port-
folio (as the MPS does) and permit transforma-
tion ofthe mortgage payment stream (as the
MBB does). An obvious way to achieve both
results would be to use mortgages to back multi-
class passthrough securities; the mortgages
would be "sold" into a trust which then would
issue security classes with different priorities to
the mortgage payment flows or different sen-
iority of claims on the collateral of the mort-
gages. The transaction would generate the
desired asset sale from the viewpoint of the is-
suer, while creating instruments with an attrac-
tive range of maturity and default characteristics.
In an important Internal Revenue Service ruling
in the early 1980's, however, several impedi-
ments against the issuance of such multiclass
passthroughs were posed. The IRS ruled that
trusts set up to hold mortgages and issue such
securities would not be given the favorable tax
treatment afforded grantor trusts, namely, insula-
tion from corporate income tax liability. Accord-
ingly, the only way that a pool of mortgages
could be securitized effectively into multiple
class securities was by issuing a variety of debt
obligations collateralized by mortgages although
this, of course, did not achieve the goal of effect-
ing "sale" of the mortgage assets out of
portfolio.
Such multiclass debt obligations are referred to
as Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMOs).
The CMO works by using the interest and princi-
pal payments flowing from the mortgage loans
to service several classes or "tranches" of debt
securities. Specifically, interest and principal
payments .are used first to service and retire the
first CMOsecurity class (typically, Class A). No
retirement of the next class (Class B) occurs until
all Class A securities are retired and so on
through the various classes of CMOs, implicitly
endowing each successive class with increasing
call protection. The last CMO security class
(sometimes called a "Z-bond") is an instrument
that receives no interest coupons and is only
retired ("reaches maturity") .after all other
classes have been retired.
Limitations on CMOs
CMOshavebeen attractive alternatives to MPs
and MBBs for both issuers and investors. Like
the MBB, the multi-class nature of the CMO per-
mits those buyers of CMOs who wish it to obtain
some call protection. The CMO has an advan-
tage over the MBB, however, in that its coupon
and principal payments are linked to the under-
lying mortgage payments. This permits the issuer
to hold relatively little equity in the CMO, so
that funds more nearly equal to the full amount
of the underlying mortgage collateral can be
raised by selling the CMOs.
The main disadvantage ofCMOs is that, .as debt
obligations, they remain on the balance sheet of
the issuer as liabilities (and the mortgages
remain as assets). This makes it harder for the
issuer to achieve standards of capital adequacy
employed by regulators or rating agencies. In
addition, in order not to violate the IRS defini-
tion of collateralized debt (and thus be classified
as a taxable multiclass trust), other criteria had
to be met by CMOs that had the effect of limit-
ing their application. Specifically, issuers could
not issue tranches with high default risk poten-
tial (that is, with a junior claim bnthe under-
lying mortgages in the event of default). Also, in
order to qualify as true "debt", the mortgage-
backed instruments had to use a semi-annual
payment convention. These and other restric-
tions limited the usefulness and flexibility of
CMOs.
Enter REMICs
Subtitle H ofthe Tax Reform Act of 1986 dra-
matically alters these circumstances by creating
a new legal device called a Real Estate Mortgage
Conduit (REMIC). The REMIC is a separate legal
entity for tax purposes into which issuers can
"sell" mortgage assets and which can issue
mortgage-backed securities. It is not a taxable
entity if it is used as a conduit for passing mort-
gage payments to holders of mortgage-backed
securities even if those securities are multi-class
securities. Indeed, the securities can be very
complex,with diverse claims on the interest,
principal and real estate collateral of the under-
lying mortgages. The REMIC thus offers all of the
opportunity to effect a "sale" of mortgage assets
out ofthe issuer's portfolio as well as the abiIity




REMICs, adjustable rate mortgages potentially
could be "unbundled" into component
securities attractive to the investor marketplace.
attractive to the marketplace - all without the
previous constraints imposed by tax law.
REMICs will facilitate the securitization of the
traditional mortgage into instruments with
various degrees of call protection and cash flow
characteristics. They obviously will facilitate the
issuance of the traditional CMO-like securities
backed by conventional mortgages, since they
remove the previous impediments to multiclass
passthroughs. By removing the restrictions on
the nature of the securities that can be issued
without adverse tax consequences, however, a
wider variety of mortgages should be able to be
securitized. Adjustable rate mortgages, for exam-
ple, have been difficult to securitize as single-
class passthroughs because of the uncertainty in
payment flows created by the interest rate caps,
payment caps and negative amortization fea-
tures associated with these mortgages. Although
there currently is legal debate over the





Securitization offers an alternative means of
dealing with risk in the mortgage market. A pool
of mortgages could be transformed into a family
of securities which differ in the seniority of their
claim to the underlying mortgages and, hence,
their default potential. This would effectively
"unbundle" the mortgage debt into low- and
high-risk securities better tailored to the diversity
of risk/return preferences that exist among inves-
tors. Under previous tax law, the issuance of
"junior" claims exposed issuers to adverse tax
treatment (although a limited number of unin-
sured mortgage pools were securitized in this
way nonetheless). With REMICs, these barriers
can be removed, facilitating this type of securi-
tization. In such an environment, the role of
government as guarantor may not be as neces-
sary to stimulate liquid markets for mortgage
assets.
REMICs and Government Mortgage Policy
REMICs also may present an opportunity to
reduce the level of government involvement in
the secondary mortgage markets. At the present
time, various Federal credit agencies and
government-sponsored intermediaries are
involved in the business of guaranteeing mort-
gages or securitiesbacked by qualifying mort-
gages. One rationale for this involvement is that,
without such guarantees, the default risk poten-
tial of certain types of mortgages would deter the
average investor from investing in mortgage~
backed securities. This, in turn, would restrain
development of a liquid secondary market for
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollaramounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments' 2 205,160 707 271 - 0.1
Loans and Leases 1 6 183,517 561 - 3,394 - 1.8
Commercial and Industrial 54,052 340 - 140 - 0.2
Real estate 68,143 219 1,665 2.5
Loans to Individuals 36,969 98 - 3,807 - 9.3
Leases 5,440 1 - 209 - 3.6
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 14,417 92 3,806 35.8
Other Securities2 7,225 53 - 684 - 8.6
Total Deposits 216,280 5,126 8,912 4.2
Demand Deposits 59,534 4,965 6,628 12.5
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 38,053 - 178 3,438 9.9
OtherTransaction Balances4 21,437 795 4,535 26.8
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 135,309 - 634 - 2,251 - 1.6
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 46,479 51 187 0.4
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 31,910 - 507 - 5,166 - 13.9
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 22,662 814 - 5,019 - 18.1
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)jDeficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.S. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TI&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items hotshown separately
7 Annualized percentchange